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BAKKEN CRUDE AND THE FORD PINTO OF RAILCARS:
THE GROWING NEED FOR ADEQUATE REGULATION OF
THE TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL BY RAIL
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 2013, a violent explosion rocked the small town of
Lac-Megantic, located in Quebec, Canada.1  The explosion leveled
nearby buildings and took the lives of forty-seven individuals.2  Re-
sponse teams finally extinguished the flames after two days of re-
lentless battle against the fire.3  The source of the explosion was a
runaway train that derailed when passing through the town.4  While
train derailments are violent in their own right, they are not com-
monly associated with explosions of such magnitude.5  The train
that derailed, however, was a seventy-two car train transporting
nearly two million gallons of crude oil from the Bakken Shale6 re-
gion of North Dakota by means of DOT-111 tanker cars.7  Upon
derailment, a spark ignited the leaking crude oil, causing the tank-
ers to explode.8
Transportation of crude oil by rail has become an increasingly
common practice and is currently responsible for the transporta-
tion of “more than [ten] percent of” all American oil.9  While the
1. Marcus Stern & Sebastian Jones, Boom - North America’s Explosive Oil-by-Rail
Problem, THE WEATHER CHANNEL (Dec. 8, 2014), http://stories.weather.com/boom
(detailing Lac-Megantic explosion).
2. Id. (discussing damage caused by Lac-Megantic explosion).
3. Id. (elaborating on damage explosion caused).
4. Michal W. Robbins, Why Do These Train Cars Carrying Oil Keep Blowing Up?,
MOTHER JONES (May 27, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environ
ment/2014/05/oil-tank-trains-bakken-crude-accidents (discussing source of Lac-
Megantic explosion).
5. See id. (discussing increased dangers of transporting oil by rail).
6. The Bakken Shale is an oil shale “located in Eastern Montana and Western
North Dakota, as well as parts of” Canada.  Bakken Shale Oil Formation, Bakken
Shale, http://bakkenshale.com/ (last visited December 20, 2015).  It is “one of the
largest oil developments in the [United States] in the past 40 years.” Id.
7. See Robbins, supra note 4 (discussing contents of derailed tank cars).
8. See id. (explaining cause of Lac-Megantic explosion); see also Joe Eaton, New
Oil Train Safety Rules Divide Rail Industry, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 1, 2014, 3:10
PM), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/10/141031-rail-in
dustry-safety-oil-standards/ (detailing why crude oil in tankers exploded).
9. See Clifford Krauss & Jad Mouawad, Accidents Surge as Oil Industry Takes the
Train, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/business
/energy-environment/accidents-surge-as-oil-industry-takes-the-train.html?_r=1
(discussing sharp increase in use of rail to transport crude oil).
(63)
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industry intended rail car use to be a temporary fix to a temporary
problem, the practice appears to be here to stay.10  Oil production
has boomed in states that are not traditionally associated with oil
production, and, as a result, states such as North Dakota lack suffi-
cient pipeline capacity to deliver all their crude oil to refineries.11
Unwilling to wait for Congress to approve the Keystone XL Pipe-
line,12 oil companies have turned to railways, resulting in an over
four thousand percent increase in the annual number of carloads
transporting crude oil.13  This unexpected and dramatic rise in rail-
car use spawned an equally sudden demand for tanker cars (tank-
ers) that could transport crude oil.14  To meet this surge in
demand, rail companies provided oil companies with the one
tanker that they had available, the DOT-111, which some have
named the “Ford Pinto of tanker cars.”15  The DOT-111 earned its
nickname because of its reputation as a tanker car prone to punc-
turing, leaking, and sparking; “[it] was never intended to haul vola-
tile crude oil.”16  The dangers of the DOT-111 tank car are
compounded given the current state of the American rail system.17
Many portions of the American railway system, including tracks and
10. See id. (discussing oil company plans to expand railways to Athabasca oil
sands).
11. See id. (explaining need for oil by rail).
12. The Keystone XL Pipeline is a proposed expansion of the already existing
Keystone Pipeline. See What is the Keystone XL Pipeline?, STATEIMPACT, https://state
impact.npr.org/texas/tag/keystone-xl-pipeline/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015) (ex-
plaining that Keystone Pipeline and proposed expansion project named Keystone
XL Pipeline).  The expansion involves two different sections: northern and south-
ern. See id.  The southern expansion, which connected Oklahoma to the Gulf
Coast by way of Texas, is already operating. See id.  The northern section, which
connects Nebraska to Alberta and, more importantly, passes through North Da-
kota’s Bakken shale play, is currently in development. See id.  The northern expan-
sion is not complete because TransCanada, the company building the Keystone XL
Pipeline, has been unable to obtain a Presidential Permit allowing it to build a
pipeline across the boarder between the United States and Canada. See id.  The
issuance of the Presidential Permit has become a political issue: some argue that
the pipeline will add jobs to the American economy while others are concerned of
the Keystone XL Pipeline’s potential environmental impact. See id.
13. See Krauss & Mouawad, supra note 9 (quantifying increase in use of rail to
transporting crude oil).  Currently, approximately 400,000 carloads of crude oil
travel by railcar per year compared to 9,500 in 2008. Id.
14. Id. (discussing recent oil boom).
15. Weather Films, Boom: An Investigation by the Weather Channel and InsideCli-
mate News, VIMEO, https://vimeo.com/113817083 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015) (ex-
plaining why DOT-111 is used for transporting crude oil).
16. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (discussing DOT-111’s dangerous design
flaws).
17. See id. (discussing how oil by rail problems extend beyond DOT-111
tankers).
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bridges, are “more than a century in age” and have not been main-
tained for years.18
Considering the aging infrastructure of the American railway
system and the DOT-111’s propensity to leak, continued transporta-
tion of crude oil by railcar poses serious environmental and safety
concerns.19  Not only did the Lac-Megantic derailment result in a
deadly explosion, but its punctured DOT-111 tanker cars spilled oil
into “nearby waterways.”20  With the increased reliance on trains to
transport oil, the number of gallons of spilled oil has increased as
well.21  As this method of transportation continues to grow, so does
the threat to the environment.22
In response to the Lac-Megantic catastrophe, Canadian regula-
tors acted swiftly, requiring the DOT-111 to either “be retrofitted or
phased out by May 2017.”23  While the United States Department of
Transportation issued emergency orders in the wake of Lac-Megan-
tic, these orders focused primarily on the due diligence required of
rail companies in transporting crude oil through towns.24  Mean-
ingful regulation pertaining to the use or improvement of the
DOT-111 faces staunch opposition from oil and railroad compa-
nies.25  As a result, regulatory efforts to curtail the dangers of oil by
rail have had mixed-success.26
Section II of this Comment discusses the events and factors
that have contributed to the increasing use and danger of rail for
18. See Weather Films, supra note 15 (discussing flaws of aging American
railways).
19. See Krauss & Mouawad, supra note 9 (discussing dangers of transportation
of crude oil by rail).
20. Eaton, supra note 8 (expanding damages from oil by rail beyond explo-
sions and to oil spills).
21. See Robbins, supra note 4 (explaining how increases in railcar use corre-
lates with increases of oil spills).
22. See id. (explaining how increases in railcar use correlates with increases of
oil spill).
23. Eaton, supra note 8 (discussing Canadian regulatory response to Lac-Me-
gantic accident).
24. See DOT Issues Emergency Order Requiring Stricter Standards to Transport Crude
Oil by Rail, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/dot-issues-
emergency-order-requiring-stricter-standards-transport-crude-oil-rail (last updated
Mar. 6, 2014) (discussing United States’ response to Lec-Megantic explosion).
The DOT passed four emergency orders over the span of seven months. Id.
25. See Eaton, supra note 8 (discussing oil and rail company opposition to
regulations concerning transportation of crude oil by rail).
26. See id. (explaining current state of regulation pertaining to transportation
of crude oil by rail).
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transporting crude oil.27 Section III assesses the destructive and en-
vironmental dangers posed by transportation of crude oil by rail.28
Section IV analyzes the regulatory response to the rise of oil as a
result of rail shipments.29  Finally, Section V addresses the need for
more regulation and discusses the impediments to additional regu-
lation of transporting oil by rail.30
II. BACKGROUND
A. North Dakota’s Bakken Shale and the North American Oil
Boom
Since 2008, North America has experienced a sharp increase in
oil production.31  One of the main catalysts for the sudden boom in
the United States is the increase of oil production in North Da-
kota.32  Previously, North Dakota produced less than 200 thousand
barrels of oil per day.33  Now, North Dakota produces over 1.2 mil-
lion barrels per day.34  With this rapid growth in production, North
Dakota has surpassed California and Alaska to become the United
States’ “second leading oil producing state.”35
The oil boom in North Dakota can be attributed to both finally
accessing the Bakken Shale and an increasing demand for domestic
27. For a discussion of the events and factors that have contributed to the
increasing use and danger of oil by rail, see infra notes 31-123 and accompanying
text.
28. For a discussion of the destructive and environmental dangers of oil by
rail, see infra notes 124-161 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the regulatory response to the rise of oil by rail, see
infra notes 162-215 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the need for more regulation and the impediments to
additional regulation, see infra notes 216-251 and accompanying text.
31. See Weather Films, supra note 15 (discussing oil boom in North America,
particularly United States).
32. Id. (attributing United States’ oil boom to fracking in North Dakota).
33. Id. (discussing pre-fracking levels of production).
34. Id. (comparing current levels of oil production to those of just five years
ago).
35. See id. (discussing North Dakota’s rise to one of the United States’ leading
oil producers); see also Jack Nicas, Oil Fuels Population Boom in North Dakota City,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2012, 8:23 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
052702304072004577328100938723454 (comparing United States’ top four oil
producing states: Alaska, California, North Dakota, and Texas); see also Associated
Press, ND Becomes Nation’s Second-Leading Oil Producer, FOX NEWS (May 15, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/05/15/nd-becomes-nation-second-leading-oil-
producer/ (commenting on North Dakota passing Alaska as United States’ second-
leading producer of oil).  North Dakota’s oil production is “second only to Texas.”
See Weather Films, supra note 15.
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oil.36  Although the shale has only recently become accessible, re-
sidents of North Dakota have long known that the Bakken Shale
contained oil deep beneath the surface.37  New technologies, such
as hydraulic fracturing (fracking), have allowed North Dakota to
tap into the Bakken Shale, resulting in a surge in oil production.38
North Dakota is able to sustain such high levels of production due
to the increasing demand for domestic oil.39  In 2009, prior to
fracking in the Bakken Shale, the United States imported approxi-
mately two-thirds of the oil it consumed.40  As a result of fracking,
the United States now only imports approximately one-third of the
oil it consumes.41
While oil companies have been able to hire more labor to keep
up with North Dakota’s rapidly increasing oil production, the
state’s pipeline infrastructure is insufficient.42  To keep up with pro-
duction, oil companies turned to railways as a means of transport-
ing the excess crude oil.43  Approximately two-thirds of the oil
produced in North Dakota travels to refineries via rail.44
36. See Robbins, supra note 4 (discussing catalyst of oil boom in North
Dakota).
37. New Boom Reshapes Oil World, Rocks North Dakota, NPR (Sept. 25, 2011, 4:00
PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/25/140784004/new-boom-reshapes-oil-world-
rocks-north-dakota (discussing oil boom in North Dakota).
38. See Christina Nunez, N.D. Oil Train Fire Spotlights Risks of Transport-
ing Crude, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 1, 2014, 10:03 AM), http://news.nationalgeo
graphic.com/news/energy/2013/12/131231-north-dakota-oil-train-fire/ (discuss-
ing use of fracking in North Dakota).  “Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is a tech-
nique designed to recover gas and oil from shale rock.” What is Fracking and Why is
it Controversial?, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
14432401 (defining hydraulic fracturing). The process involves drilling horizon-
tally into a rock layer containing natural gas, known as a shale, and using a “high-
pressure water mixture . . . to release the gas inside.” Id.  Fracking is a controver-
sial practice because it can be used to reach natural gas previously thought to be
unobtainable, but at the cost of severe negative impacts on the environment. See
id.
39. See New Boom Reshapes Oil World, Rocks North Dakota, supra note 37 (discuss-
ing increasing demand for domestic oil).
40. Id. (discussing United States’ prior dependence on foreign oil).
41. See Kiran Dhillon, Why Are U.S. Oil Imports Falling?, TIME (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://time.com/67163/why-are-u-s-oil-imports-falling/ (discussing sharp decline
in oil imports).
42. See New Boom Reshapes Oil World, Rocks North Dakota, supra note 37 (discuss-
ing boom towns popping up in North Dakota as workers flood well sites); see also
Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (explaining how North Dakota’s pipelines were insuffi-
cient to keep up with oil production).  Construction of the Keystone XL pipeline
would alleviate much of the burden placed on North Dakota’s current pipelines.
See Eaton, supra note 8; see also infra notes 55-58, 230-48 and accompanying text.
43. Weather Films, supra note 15 (explaining how oil companies are using
railroad system to transport crude oil that pipelines cannot carry).
44. See Krauss & Mouawad, supra note 9 (discussing amount of oil North Da-
kota ships on railcar).
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North Dakota is not alone in this new practice.45  Oil by rail has
become common throughout the American Midwest and Canada.46
Roughly two hundred railroad lines, or “virtual pipelines,” connect
Casselton, North Dakota; Houston, Texas; and numerous shale
plays in between these states.47  These lines are not limited to the
Midwest; they reach as far west as Bakersfield, California and pass
through major cities such as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Port-
land, Oregon.48  Prior to 2010, less than one percent of American
oil was carried via rail, but today that share is “more than ten
percent.”49
Canada transports crude oil from the Alberta oil sands to refin-
eries by rail.50  The oil sands in Alberta, Canada are the third larg-
est in the world and are capable of producing 1.9 million barrels of
oil per day.51  Transporting crude oil by rail is a growing practice in
Canada, just like it is in the United States.52  Evidencing this
growth, in December of 2013, the first train carrying crude oil from
Canadian oil sands departed from a newly constructed rail terminal
in Edmonton, Alberta.53  The new terminal runs East and West
across Canada and can distribute 890 thousand barrels of oil per
day.54
45. See id. (commenting that transporting oil by rail is not unique to North
Dakota).
46. See id. (discussing how use of railcar has become popular throughout
Midwest).
47. See id. (mapping railroads lines used for transporting oil).
48. See id. (discussing expansiveness of railroad lines carrying oil, including a
line connecting Topeka, Kansas to Bakersfield, California); see also Stern & Jones,
supra note 1 (naming Philadelphia and Portland as major urban areas that tankers
carrying oil pass through).
49. See Krauss & Mouawad, supra note 9 (discussing increasing use of rail to
transport oil).
50. See Yadullah Hussain, Oil-by-rail Gathers Steam as New Capacity Comes on Line,
FIN. POST (Jan. 9, 2014, 4:51 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/2014/01/
09/oil-by-rail-gathers-steam-as-new-capacity-comes-on-line/?__lsa=07fa-5ee3 (dis-
cussing expansion of Canada’s rail infrastructure to accommodate oil by rail).
51. Oil Sands, ALBERTA, http://www.energy.alberta.ca/ourbusiness/oil-
sands.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (discussing size and production capacity of
Alberta oil sands).  Alberta’s oil sands are third behind Saudi Arabia and Vene-
zuela’s. Id.  Alberta anticipates being able to produce as much as 3.8 million bar-
rels per day by 2022. Id.
52. See Hussain, supra note 50 (discussing increasing use of rail to transport
crude oil in Canada).
53. See id. (discussing expansion of rail infrastructure to accommodate de-
mands of oil distribution).  Canexus Corp., owner of the new terminal, is one of
many companies building new terminals or expanding old ones in an effort to
match demand for crude oil. See id.  Some of these projects cost more than 100
million dollars to complete. Id.
54. See id. (comparing capacity of new rail terminal to Keystone XL pipeline).
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Transportation of crude oil by rail was initially a short-term and
makeshift solution for the distribution problems in the United
States, but the practice appears to have become permeant.55  Al-
though the Keystone XL pipeline would increase Midwest pipeline
capacity and reduce dependency on rail, politics have made the
pipeline’s future uncertain.56  Delays regarding the Keystone XL
pipeline have caused oil companies to further invest in rail.57
While the Keystone XL pipeline could carry 830 thousand barrels
per day, rail is already carrying 760 thousand barrels per day.58
B. American Rail: A Second Great Boom and the
Transportation of Crude Oil
With the increasing use of rail to transport unstable crude oil,
the critics of the practice are scrutinizing the state of the American
railroad system.59  In particular, critics are concerned that Ameri-
can railroads are not in sufficient condition to transport such haz-
ardous cargo, especially considering that some sections are over
one hundred years old.60  Critics fear that without adequate federal
oversight, the private businesses that own the majority of American
railroad lines lack the proper incentives to safely maintain railroad
lines.61
1. The Reemergence of American Freight Rail
By the 1970s, the once great American railroad system strug-
gled to keep pace with its more popular competitors: airplanes and
55. See Krauss & Mouawad, supra note 9 (terming transportation of oil by rail
“stopgap measure”).
56. See id. (linking delays in Keystone XL Pipeline to increased demand for oil
by rail); see also Robbins, supra note 4 (discussing growing uncertainty regarding
approval of Keystone XL pipeline).
57. See Eaton, supra note 8 (discussing American Petroleum Institute’s argu-
ment that failure to approve Keystone XL pipeline requires further investment in
rail).
58. See id. (comparing estimated capacity of Keystone XL pipeline to current
capabilities of American rail).  For a further discussion of the Keystone XL pipe-
line’s impact on oil by rail, see infra notes 230-48 and accompanying text.
59. See Joann Muller et al., All Aboard: Why America’s Second Rail Boom Has
Plenty of Room to Run, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/joannmuller/2014/01/22/americas-second-rail-boom/ (discussing how
transportation of oil by rail has resulted in heighted scrutiny of American railroad
infrastructure).
60. See Weather Films, supra note 15 (expressing concern over age of railroad
infrastructure).
61. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (discussing lack of standards for private
maintenance of railroads).  For a more complete discussion of the state of regula-
tion regarding railroad maintenance, see infra notes 162-215 and accompanying
text.
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automobiles.62  American rail began to transition into its modern
form when Congress passed the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,63 which
deregulated the industry by allowing railroad companies to exit the
flagging passenger rail business and focus exclusively on freight.64
Once deregulated, railroad companies possessed greater control
over price setting and could contract privately with shippers.65
Price control and contracting increased competition not only
amongst the rail companies, but also amongst the airline and auto-
mobile industries.66
Since the passage of the Staggers Rail Act, the rail industry has
centralized its resources; the industry condensed from twenty-six
large railroad carriers into just seven large carriers.67  Further, the
post-Staggers Act era also  led to an influx of investment.68  Because
railroads are privately owned, private owners of American railroads
bear the costly responsibility of maintaining a sound infrastruc-
ture.69  In the thirty years since the passage of the Staggers Act, the
rail industry has invested over 500 billion dollars in infrastructure.70
62. See Elizabeth Dovell, U.S. Rail Infrastructure, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/infrastructure/us-rail-infrastructure/p27585
(discussing American rail industry’s inability to keep up with emerging modes of
transportation in twentieth century); see also Joel Palley, Impact of the Staggers Rail
Act of 1980, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED.  RAILROAD ADMIN. (Mar. 8, 2011), https://
www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L03012 (discussing additional obstacles rail indus-
try faced when competing with airline and automotive industry).
63. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012).
64. See Dovell, supra note 62 (discussing Staggers Rail Act’s role in bringing
about modern rail system by deregulating American railroad industry and thus
allowing railroads to control price setting and privately contract with shippers).
The Staggers Rail Act did not completely deregulate the industry, but it did re-
present a significant decrease in regulation of the industry. See id.
65. See Palley, supra note 62 (listing rail industry’s new freedoms post Staggers
Rail Act).
66. See id. (discussing positive impact of Staggers Rail Act).  Prior to the Stag-
gers Rail Act, freight rail had been sharply declining in market share of freight
shipments; after the Staggers Rail Act, however, rail stabilized at above forty per-
cent market share, which is greater than its pre-Staggers’ share. See id.
67. See Dovell, supra note 62 (commenting on consolidation of rail industry
post Staggers Rail Act).
68. See Michael Grunwald, Back on Tracks, TIME (July 9, 2012), http://busi
ness.time.com/2012/07/09/us-freight-railroads/ (discussing rail’s heavy invest-
ment in its own infrastructure).
69. See Am. Soc’y for Civil Eng’rs, Rail: Conditions & Capacity, 2013 REP. CARD
FOR AM. INFRASTRUCTURE, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/rail/
conditions-and-capacity (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) (discussing rail infrastructure’s
dependency on private investment).
70. See id. (providing amount rail industry has invested into its infrastructure).
Investment is not purely a private matter; state and federal governments have also
provided grants to railroads. See Am. Soc’y for Civil Eng’rs, Rail: Success Stories,
2013 REP. CARD FOR AM. INFRASTRUCTURE, http://www.infrastructurereport
card.org/a/#p/rail/success-stories (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) (discussing use of fed-
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In recent years, the private sector has spent approximately twenty
billion dollars per year on railroad infrastructure.71  In its 2013 Re-
port Card For America’s Infrastructure, the American Society of Civil
Engineers noted, “in 2010 alone, freight railroads renewed the rails
on more than 3,100 miles of railroad track, equivalent to going
coast to coast.”72  Investment trends indicate that even without ex-
tensive federal oversight, the rail industry’s private sector has
placed an emphasis on securing its infrastructure.73  Notwithstand-
ing its impressive investment in infrastructure, the American Soci-
ety of Civil Engineers graded the rail industry a “C+” in its 2013
Report Card For America’s Infrastructure.74
2. Growing Concerns Over Safety
The Midwest’s oil shale boom has been the driving force in the
railroad industry’s most recent resurgence.75  Currently, American
freight rails are transporting an unprecedented amount of crude
oil.76  With increased transportation of this dangerous freight, there
eral and state funds to invest in Oklahoma’s “rolling pipeline”).  In 2011, the
Oklahoma Department of Transportation invested in a “rolling pipeline” project
to improve the transportation of oil cars through Oklahoma. See id.  The project
would upgrade the existing state owned rail line from Class Three standards to
Class Two standards so that it could support longer trains traveling at faster speeds.
See id.  “Using a 20 percent local match, the $8.4-million project was awarded a
TIGER grant in 2011 to create a rolling pipeline of domestically produced energy
due to its unusually high benefit-cost ratio.” Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  In this case, the benefits of rail were clear because trucking costs were pro-
hibitive and no pipeline alternative existed.” See id.
71. See Muller et al., supra note 59 (quantifying private sector investments in
railroad infrastructure); see also Am. Soc’y for Civil Eng’rs, Rail: Investment and
Funding, 2013 REP. CARD FOR AM. INFRASTRUCTURE, http://www.infrastructurere
portcard.org/a/#p/rail/investment-and-funding (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) [here-
inafter Investment and Funding] (listing consistently increasing private sector invest-
ment amounts of $20.2 billion in 2007 through $23.3 billion in 2011).
72. See Am. Soc’y for Civil Eng’rs, Rail, 2013 REP. CARD FOR AM. INFRASTRUC-
TURE, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/rail/overview (last visited
Feb. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Rail] (detailing extent to which rail industry invests in
infrastructure).
73. See Grunwald, supra note 68 (deeming rail industry to be evidence that
private sector can be trusted to invest in infrastructure).
74. See Rail, supra note 72 (assessing quality of United States’ rail infrastruc-
ture).  While a C+ is not a strong grade, rail tied with bridges for the second high-
est grade; the highest grade went to solid waste, which only received a “B-.” See id.
75. See Grunwald, supra note 68 (linking current oil boom to current railroad
boom).
76. See Muller et al., supra note 59 (attributing rail boom to oil boom).  BNSF
Chairman Matt Rose described the current trend in transportation of oil by rail as
“like nothing I’ve ever seen in my career.” See id.
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is an equally growing concern over rail safety.77  As pressure mounts
to transport as much oil as possible from Alberta’s tar sands to Gulf
Coast refineries, railroads are adding an increasing number of oil
tankers to their trains to maximize the amount of oil each train can
transport.78  Consequently, railroad companies are using longer
trains to accommodate additional oil tankers, a practice contribut-
ing to a dramatic increase in rail accidents.79  Despite an eighty per-
cent decrease in the railroad accident rate from 1980 to 2012,
American rail accidents in 2013 were responsible for spilling more
oil in that one year than the previous thirty years combined.80
Despite the praise for the private sector’s investments in infra-
structure, critics are concerned that rail infrastructure may be inad-
equate to transport such high volumes of crude oil.81  The disparity
of resources between the freight rail industry’s largest and smallest
companies is of particular concern.82  North American railroads are
classified as Class 1, railroads with operating revenues of more than
$433.2 million; Class 2, railroads with operating revenues less than
$433.2 million but more than $34.7 million; or Class 3, railroads
77. See id. (connecting increased transportation of oil by rail to increased risk
of accidents); see also, Robbins, supra note 4 (noting sharp increase in rail accidents
over recent years).
78. See James Conca, Pick Your Poison for Crude—Pipeline, Rail, Truck or Boat,
FORBES (Apr. 26, 2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/
2014/04/26/pick-your-poison-for-crude-pipeline-rail-truck-or-boat/ (explaining
growing pressure on railroads to maximize amount of oil each train transports).
Delays with the Keystone XL Pipeline have left railroads with the burden of meet-
ing the pipeline’s promised supply of oil from Alberta’s tar sands. See id.
79. See id. (attributing recent increase in rail accidents to aggressively adding
more cars to each train).
80. See id. (providing puzzling statistics that show decreases in accidents but
increases in amount of oil spilled).  In 2013, American railroad accidents spilled
1.5 million gallons of crude oil. See id.  This number would be significantly greater
if it were to include oil spilled in Canada as well; the Lac-Megantic derailment
alone spilled 1.6 million gallons of crude oil. See id.  While an increase in the
amount of oil spilled is an expected consequence of shipping more oil on rail, it
still marks a troubling upward trend. See id.  The rail and oil industries argue that
the vast majority of oil shipped by rail arrives safely at its destination, but for those
concerned about the environment and human health, the issue is more a matter of
net oil spilled, and less the rate at which spills occur. See id.
81. See Eric de Place & Rich Feldman, The Big Problem with Letting Small Rail-
roads Haul Oil, SIGHTLINE DAILY (Oct. 8, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://daily.sightline.
org/2014/10/08/the-big-problem-with-letting-small-railroads-haul-oil/ [hereinaf-
ter de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem] (expressing concern regarding small rail-
road companies transporting oil due to insufficient resources to maintain safe
rails); see also Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (raising concerns over private sector’s
maintenance of rail bridges).
82. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (comparing invest-
ment practices common amongst small railroads to investment practices of larger
railroads).
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with operating revenues less than $34.7 million.83  Class 1 railroads,
comprised only of North America’s seven largest railroad compa-
nies, own and operate large, national railroads, whereas the smaller
railroad companies own the short, local railroads.84  While the
seven giant companies can finance the necessary maintenance that
their rails require, smaller railroad companies lack sufficient re-
sources to do  the same for short line rails.85
Montreal, Maine & Atlantic (MMA) was responsible for the
freight train that derailed and exploded in Lac-Megantic.86  Assem-
bled from the bankruptcy assets of four small railroad companies,
MMA was a regional railroad company based out of Chicago that
struggled since its inception to establish financial stability.87  Lead-
ing up to the tragic events of Lac-Megantic, financial struggles
forced MMA to reduce staff and maintenance efforts.88  According
to statements investigators took from MMA employees, MMA used
second-hand locomotives to transport Bakken crude oil and elected
to “lower[ ] the speed limit instead of repairing the tracks.”89
The troubling circumstances surrounding the Lac-Megantic
derailment are not unique to MMA; other small railroads face simi-
lar problems.90  In less than one year, two trains carrying oil de-
83. See Rail: Conditions & Capacity, supra note 69 (listing three types of rail and
what type of company primarily owns each classification).
84. See id. (explaining that short line railroads are maintained by small rail-
road companies).
85. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (discussing wide-
spread financial instability of small railroad companies across United States).
There are seven major railroads operating in North America, and they are the only
Class I railroads: BNSF Railway, CSX Transportation, Grand Trunk Corporation,
Kansas City Southern Railway, Norfolk Southern Combined Railroad Subsidiaries,
Soo Line Railroad, and Union Pacific Railroad. Freight Rail Today, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF TRANSP. FED. RAILROAD ADMIN., https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0362
(last visited May 31, 2015) (listing seven Class I railroads).
86. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (assessing financial
stability of small railroad company that owned train that derailed in Lac-Megan-
tic).  MMA was a regional railroad, and costs associated with the fall-out from the
Lac-Megantic tragedy bankrupted MMA. See id.
87. See id. (explaining formation and economic instability of MMA).
88. See id. (discussing cutbacks MMA made).
89. Monique Beaudin, MMA Workers Feared a Catastrophe, Document Shows,
MONTREAL GAZETTE (Jun. 12, 2014), http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/
workers+feared+catastrophe+document+shows/9937577/story.html (recounting
MMA employees’ allegations of insufficient investment by MMA).  MMA employ-
ees gave statements as part of the Suˆrete´ du Que´bec investigation into the Lac-
Megantic catastrophe. See id.
90. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (assessing dangers
in allowing small railroad companies to transport oil).  Large Class 1 railroad com-
panies are not immune to oil car derailments. See Tracie Mauriello, Railroads, Reg-
ulators Adopt Curbs on Shipping Crude Oil, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 21, 2014,
11:46 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/transportation/2014/02/22/
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railed in western Alabama, one in November 2013 and the other in
June 2014.91  Both derailments happened just west of Tuscaloosa,
on railroads owned by small companies.92  The more troubling of
the derailments was the November 2013 derailment in Aliceville,
Alabama.93  A small railroad company, Alabama & Gulf Coast Rail-
way (AGR), owned the train that derailed while traversing a small
wooden trestle in Aliceville; the resulting oil spill was the worst de-
railment oil spill in the history of the United States.94  Like MMA,
financial troubles and inconsistent management plagued AGR.95
While an inability to invest in the maintenance of the trestle is the
likely cause of the derailment, it is impossible to determine whether
AGR adequately maintained the trestle because the derailment
caused a fire and burned the trestle to ash.96
Additional concerns exist regarding the sufficiency of the in-
surance that railroad companies carry.97  Gennesee & Wyoming,
one of the nation’s largest and most successful regional and short
line railroad companies, is insured for liability up to 500 million
Railroads-regulators-adopt-curbs-on-shipping-crude-oil/stories/201402220059.  In
Pennsylvania, two oil-carrying trains derailed within a month of each other in early
2014; Class 1 railroad companies owned both the trains and the railroads that the
trains derailed on. See id.; see also Sarah Glover et al., Train Derails on Bridge over
Schuylkill River, NBC10.COM, http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Train-
Derails-Schuykill-Expressway-Closed-241114931.html (last updated Jan. 21, 2014,
1:06 AM) (detailing 2014 Philadelphia train derailment).
91. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (discussing Novem-
ber 2013 derailment); see also Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (discussing June 2014
derailment).
92. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (discussing derail-
ment on wooden trestle owned by Alabama & Gulf Coast Railway); see also Stern &
Jones, supra note 1 (discussing derailment near M&O bridge in Tuscaloosa,
Alabama).
93. Compare de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (noting result-
ing oil spill from Aliceville derailment was worst spill by oil car in United States
history) with Brianne Britzius, Residents Return Home After Train Derailment in Tusca-
loosa Co., FOX 6 WBRC, http://www.myfoxal.com/story/25790227/residents-re
turn-home-after-train-derailment-in-tuscaloosa-co (last updated June 23, 2014, 4:50
PM) (noting oil cars derailed in Buhl, Alabama but did not leak crude oil).
94. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (stating conditions
under which train derailed).
95. See id. (comparing MMA and AGR’s similar struggles with obtaining con-
sistent investments and management).  AGR never had a consistent source of capi-
tal or leadership because railroad holding companies routinely bought and sold
AGR. See id.  As such, the railroad company’s ownership was constantly changing,
leading to unpredictable changes in management and varying degrees of capital to
invest in maintaining its infrastructure. See id.
96. See id. (determining conclusive information regarding state of trestle
would likely be impossible to discover in wreckage).
97. See id. (analyzing insurance’s effect on transporting oil by rail).
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dollars.98  A typical short line railroad company will be insured up
to twenty million dollars.99  The estimated cost of rebuilding Lac-
Megantic, however, is 2.7 billion dollars.100  If Gennesee & Wyo-
ming was the company responsible for the accident and were to use
up its entire insurance policy and liquidate all of its assets, it would
still be 600 million dollars shy of the total liability cost.101  There-
fore, non-Class 1 railroad companies are simply not capitalized suf-
ficient enough to protect themselves from liability of carrying oil.102
The Lac-Megantic accident left MMA bankrupt, forcing the Cana-
dian government to step in and cover much of the costs associated
with the accident.103
C. The DOT-111 Tanker Car: A Known Danger
Critics cite the DOT-111 tank car as the most dangerous ele-
ments of transporting oil by rail.104  The DOT-111 debuted in the
1960s as a tanker for transporting corn syrup and other nonflam-
mable cargo.105  As such, the tanker’s design is inherently unsuita-
ble for transporting flammable cargo such as Bakken crude oil.106
In 1991, after decades of use, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) issued numerous warnings regarding the tendency
of the DOT-111’s shell to puncture in derailments.107  Notwith-
standing the NTSB’s findings, the ethanol industry continues to use
DOT-111 tankers, even after a derailment in 2009 caused a deadly
fire.108
98. See id. (detailing value of Gennesse & Wyoming’s insurance policy).
99. See Marina Villeneuve, After ‘End of the World’ Explosion, Lac-Megantic Aims to
Rebuild, PORTLAND PRESS HAROLD (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/
2014/04/17/after-end-of-the-world-explosion-lac-megantic-aims-to-rebuild/ (dis-
cussing insurance policies common for small railroad companies traveling short
distances).  A twenty-five million dollar policy is typically the maximum available
policy for short-line railroad companies. See id.  This is the type of policy that MMA
had. See id.
100. Id. (estimating cost of rebuilding Lac-Megantic).
101. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (valuing Gennesse
& Wyoming and its insurance policy at 2.1 billion dollars).
102. See id. (discussing industry’s general lack of preparation to deal with ma-
jor accident liability).
103. See Villeneuve, supra note 99 (discussing financial consequences of Lac-
Megantic accident).
104. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (analyzing in depth issues surrounding
DOT-111).
105. See id. (discussing origins of DOT-111).
106. See id. (noting DOT-111 does not lend tanker to carrying flammable
cargo).
107. See id. (discussing NTSB warnings regarding dangers DOT-111 posed).
108. See id. (criticizing continued use of DOT-111s despite NTSB warnings
that tanker was unsafe for transporting hazardous materials).
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The 2009 derailment led the NTSB to comment on the DOT-
111’s “need for extra protection such as head shields, tank jackets,
more robust top fittings protection, and modification of bottom
outlet valves on DOT-111 tank cars used to transport hazardous
materials.”109  The DOT-111’s head shields lack adequate protec-
tion for transporting hazardous materials because in their current
state, they are prone to massive puncturing if the couplers break off
upon collision.110  The steel shell of the DOT-111 is less than 1/2-
inch thick, whereas modern tanker cars have a 9/16-inch jacket.111
In the event of a DOT-111 rolling over during derailment, the in-
sufficiently shielded top valve and fittings of the DOT-111 are sus-
ceptible to opening up and spilling the tanker’s cargo.112  In
addition to the flaws that the NTSB enumerated, “the draft sill,
which connects the tank to the wheels, may fail in derailments,
causing the tank to tear” and subsequently dump its cargo.113  A
tank car so prone to leaking its cargo is ill-equipped to carry hazard-
ous cargo, especially considering the flammability of the cargo.114
Unforeseen demand for tank cars is in part responsible for the
oil industry’s use of the decades-old DOT-111.115  The rail industry
could not have predicted the United States’ recent oil boom and
the oil industry’s subsequent reliance on rail to transport such large
volumes of crude oil.116  As such, the rail industry did not have
tankers designed to carry such hazardous material readily available;
what it did have was the DOT-111.117  Although the DOT-111 was
the only available tanker, the rail industry was already well aware of
the dangers it posed.118  Over the years, the oil industry has ac-
109. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing NTSB’s comment on DOT-111’s design and necessary modifications to make
tanker safer).
110. Robbins, supra note 4 (detailing flaw in DOT-111 head shield); see also
Weather Films, supra note 15 (discussing unsafe design of DOT-111).
111. Eaton, supra note 8 (comparing old DOT-111 to modern tank cars).
112. Robbins, supra note 4 (detailing flaw in DOT-111’s top valve).
113. Id. (listing DOT-111’s design flaws).
114. See Weather Films, supra note 15 (discussing violent danger transporting
Bakken crude oil by rail poses).
115. See id. (attributing oil industry’s use of DOT-111 to sudden and signifi-
cant demand for tankers).
116. See id. (commenting how unexpected recent North American oil boom
was).
117. See id. (explaining how unexpected boom led to reliance on transporta-
tion equipment ill equipped to transfer explosive material).
118. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (determining NTSB warned of DOT-111’s
dangers since 1991).
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quired modern tankers, but approximately seventy-eight thousand
original-design DOT-111s are still in active use.119
The DOT-111 has many design flaws that pose a grave danger
to the environment and to citizens of towns that DOT-111 tanks
pass through, but it can be retrofitted to compensate for its flaws.120
In the aftermath of Lac-Megantic, companies such as GBW Railcar
Services have formed to serve as tanker car repair shops, ensuring
that tankers are in sufficient operating condition and that DOT-
111s are adequately updated.121  While the means to retrofit the
dangerous DOT-111 exist, the oil industry is hesitant to invest in
such precautions.122  The estimated cost of retrofitting all DOT-
111s still in use is one billion dollars, which is undoubtedly a sizable
investment; nevertheless, one billion dollars is still less than half the
cost of rebuilding Lac-Megantic and defending the related
lawsuits.123
III. THE DANGERS OF OIL BY RAIL
Transporting oil by rail poses two primary dangers.124  First,
tankers engulfed in flames can cause explosions.125  Second, spill-
ing crude oil is an environmental hazard.126
A. Explosive Crude
The derailment at Lac-Megantic is proof that transporting oil
by rail poses a serious threat to humans.127  This explosive threat is
two-fold: there is the violence of the initial blast followed by the
subsequent fire.128  Of the Lac-Megantic catastrophe’s forty-seven
119. See Robbins, supra note 4 (providing approximate number of original
design DOT-111s still in use).
120. See Eaton, supra note 8 (discussing options for addressing DOT-111 de-
sign flaws).
121. See id. (discussing ability to retrofit DOT-111 tankers to comply with
modern designs).
122. See id. (noting oil industry’s resistance to investing money in rail safety).
123. See Robbins, supra note 4 (estimating cost of retrofitting all DOT-111
tankers in use); see also Villeneuve, supra note 99 (estimating cost of rebuilding Lac-
Megantic to be 2.7 billion dollars).
124. For a general discussion of the two dangers, see infra notes 127-161 and
accompanying text.
125. For a discussion of the explosive dangers, see infra notes 127-145 and
accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of the environmental dangers, see infra notes 146-161
and accompanying text.
127. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (discussing how Lac-Megantic derailment
killed forty-seven people).
128. See Villeneuve, supra note 99 (explaining damage of first initial explosion
followed by fire that spread further into town).
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victims, five remain missing.129  The fact that five bodies were never
recovered suggests that the initial blast vaporized these victims.130
The fire that followed the blast did not present as immediate of a
threat as the initial explosion, but it is concerning that response
teams took two days to put out the fire that burned through Lac-
Megantic.131  Evidence supports that an initial explosion and subse-
quent fire can heat the remaining derailed tankers carrying oil to
the point of sparking a second wave of explosions.132
It is troubling to imagine such a catastrophic event happening
in a major urban area, but the reality is that DOT-111 tankers carry-
ing Bakken crude oil travel through major towns and cities.133  Spe-
cifically there are forty-six “federally designated high-threat urban
areas” in which these dangerous tankers travel.134  DOT-111s carry
oil through both major cities such as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
and smaller cities such as Aurora, Illinois, located just outside of
Chicago.135  If a DOT-111 carrying Bakken crude oil were to derail
and explode in one of these cities, the damage would be unimagin-
able.136  The United States has already come close to suffering its
own Lac-Megantic catastrophe when a train with DOT-111 tankers
carrying Bakken crude oil derailed and exploded outside the town
of Casselton, North Dakota.137
129. Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (noting that five victims are still missing).
130. See id. (stating Lac-Megantic explosion vaporized five of the forty-seven
victims).
131. See Weather Films, supra note 15 (discussing severity of fire in Lac-
Megantic).
132. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (explaining how burning oil tankers act as
“blow torches” to nearby tankers and thereby trigger another set of explosions).
For a further discussion on how burning oil tankers can lead to a chain reaction of
exploding oil tankers, see infra notes 144-145.  The February of 2015 derailment in
West Virginia demonstrated this effect, as there were multiple waves of explosions.
See Dan Heyman & Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, Spilled Oil Keeps Flames Burning After a Train
Derailment in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/18/us/west-virginia-train-derailment-dumps-oil-into-river.html (describ-
ing terror residents felt after witnessing multiple waves of explosions).
133. See Weather Films, supra note 15 (discussing urban and metropolitan ar-
eas that tankers carrying oil travel through).
134. See Mauriello, supra note 90 (recognizing federally designated threat
zones).
135. See Weather Films, supra note 15 (listing densely populated areas in
which tankers carrying oil pass through).  In January 2014, a tanker carrying oil
derailed on a bridge crossing the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia; fortunately, the
derailment did not result in a spill. See Glover et al., supra note 90.
136. See Weather Films, supra note 15 (expressing fear that Lac-Megantic level
explosion could happen in more densely populated areas).
137. See Krauss & Mouawad, supra note 9 (reporting on oil explosion outside
of Casselton).  The derailment, which occurred just one half mile outside the small
16
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The unique properties of Bakken crude oil contribute to vio-
lent explosions.138  Not all crude oil is the same, and “Bakken’s
[crude oil] is more like gasoline and rich in volatile natural gas
liquids, including methane, ethane, propane and butane.”139
When refineries process crude oil, they separate out the crude oil
from the natural gases.140  North Dakota, however, lacks the capac-
ity to refine all of its Bakken crude oil in-state, and thus ships its
excess via rail to refineries along the Gulf Coast.141  During trans-
port to the south, “the natural gas liquids separate from the oil and
become gaseous, forming an explosive propane-butane blanket on
top of the oil.”142  If the “blanket” were to ignite, as would occur if a
tanker derails and sparks the gas, the tanker would explode.143  The
flames from the initial explosion would heat nearby tankers to ex-
treme temperatures and, as the flames spread, would trigger a
chain of exploding tankers.144  As trains are getting longer, and
thus linking more and more oil tankers, a derailment could poten-
tially cause incredible damage.145
B. Environmental Concerns
Trains carrying oil that derail also pose a significant risk to the
environment.146  In 2013, American trains spilled 1.5 million gal-
lons of oil; this is more than the amount spilled in the preceding
town of Casselton, North Dakota, resulted in a fiery explosion and forced the evac-
uation of the town. Id.
138. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (linking properties of Bakken crude to
violence of explosions).
139. Id. (attributing violent explosions to Bakken’s similarity to gasoline and
abundance of volatile natural gases).
140. Id. (describing how crude oil gets separated from natural gases).
141. See id. (explaining why Bakken crude oil is not separated from natural
gases when it ships out of North Dakota).
142. Id. (describing how Bakken crude oil becomes explosive).
143. See Stern & Jones, supra note 1 (discussing how sparks and punctured
tankers could trigger explosion).
144. See id. (explaining how one explosion could trigger chain of explosions
by acting as “blow torch” to nearby tankers).  Stern and Jones explain this phenom-
enon as follows:
If a railcar ruptures—and if some of the gas comes into contact with the
outside air and a spark occurs—the railcar will explode and act as a blow
torch on the car next to it. The result is a series of explosions like those
captured on cellphones after the Lac-Megantic. . . .
Id.
145. See id. (discussing extent of damage that train explosions can cause).  A
single train can haul as much as three million gallons of oil, which is “enough to
fill a football field almost as high as the goal posts.” Id.
146. For a discussion of how train derailments harm the environment, see
infra notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
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forty-two years combined.147  In 2013, the worst oil spill resulted
from a derailment outside of Aliceville, Alabama.148  Twenty-six
train cars derailed and spilled an estimated 700 thousand gallons of
Bakken crude.149  That was the largest American oil spill from a
derailed train on record.150  While not all derailments spill hun-
dreds of thousands of gallons of crude oil, oil tanker derailments
are occurring at an increasingly rapid rate.151
Again, Lac-Megantic is an example of how damaging a derail-
ment can be, as that train spilled 1.6 million gallons of oil.152  The
Lac-Megantic derailment alone spilled more oil than all American
tankers combined in 2013.153  Oil spilled into the surrounding soil,
the Chaudie`re River, and the town’s sewer system.154  Officials esti-
mate the derailment contaminated 12.3 million gallons of water
and between twelve thousand and twenty-two thousand cubic me-
ters of soil.155  The Quebec government values Lac-Megantic’s envi-
ronmental cleanup cost at 200 million dollars.156
Waterways in particular are susceptible to environmental con-
tamination from crude oil spills.157  The nation’s more prominent
147. See Robbins, supra note 4 (discussing amount of oil spilled since 1971).
148. See id. (discussing Aliceville oil spill in comparison to other oil spills).
149. Id. (detailing Aliceville oil spill).
150. See de Place & Feldman, The Big Problem, supra note 81 (distinguishing
Aliceville oil spill as United States’ worst).
151. See Joby Warrick, Trains Are Carrying – And Spilling – a Record Amount of
Oil, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2015/02/17/trains-are-carrying-and-spilling-a-record-amount-of-
oil/ (analyzing sharp increase in number of oil spills attributed to train derail-
ments in 2013 and 2014 compared to previous twenty-five years).  In 2014, 141
trains derailed and resulted in an oil spill. See id.  In comparison, from 1975 to
2012, the average number of train derailments resulting in oil spills was twenty-five
per year. See id.
152. See Villeneuve, supra note 99 (discussing how much oil was spilled in Lac-
Megantic).
153. See Robbins, supra note 4 (comparing Lac-Megantic derailment to Ameri-
can oil spills in 2013).
154. See Monique Beaudin, Huge Scope of Lac-Me´gantic Cleanup Comes into Focus,
MONTREAL GAZETTE (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.montrealgazette.com/health/
Huge+scope+M%C3%A9gantic+cleanup+comes+into+focus/9348298/story.html
(assessing extent to which spilled oil seeped into Lac-Megantic and surrounding
area). See id.
155. See Villeneuve, supra note 99 (quantifying impact of oil spill on Lac-Me-
gantic water); see also Beaudin, supra note 154 (quantifying impact of oil spill on
Lac-Megantic soil).  Experts attribute oil’s pervasive permeation into Lac-Megan-
tic’s waters to its infiltration of Lac-Megantic’s sewer system. See Beaudin, supra
note 154.
156. See Beaudin, supra note 154 (estimating costs of environmental cleanup
for Lac-Megantic to be at least 200 million dollars).
157. See Curtis Tate, Lynchburg, Va., Oil Train Derailment Illustrates Threat to Riv-
ers, MCCLATCHY DC (May 2, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/05/02/
18
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railroads typically run along waterways because the land surround-
ing waterways offers flatter gradients suitable for railroads using
heavy trains.158  As booming demand for oil forces railroad compa-
nies to put additional tankers on each train, trains are becoming
heavier and therefore need to travel on the flat railroads lining wa-
terways.159  Naturally, as more trains carrying crude oil travel along
waterways, the risk of a spill contaminating a waterway increases.160
Contaminated waterways pose not only a threat to local communi-
ties near the derailment, but to all other areas downstream from
the derailment.161
IV. REGULATION OF OIL BY RAIL
Both the United States and Canada have initiated regulatory
responses to the Lac-Megantic disaster and the growing risk of
transporting oil by rail.162  While both nations plan to phase out the
DOT-111 by 2017, neither has offered a comprehensive plan for
reducing the risks presented by tank cars and Bakken crude oil.163
Early proposals, however, indicate Canadian regulators are taking a
more aggressive approach to regulation than their American coun-
226425/lynchburg-va-oil-train-derailment.html (discussing exposure of waterways
to oils spills from train derailments).  Following the derailment in Lynchburg, the
environmental watchdog group, Columbia Riverkeeper, called upon state and lo-
cal governments to follow the lead set by Albany, New York and suspend expansion
activity for all rail terminals along waterways. See id.
158. See id. (discussing how important railroads typically run along water-
ways).  The term “grade” refers to the slope of the railroad. See Robert S. McGoni-
gal, Grades and Curves, TRAINS (May 1, 2006), http://trn.trains.com/railroads/abcs-
of-railroading/2006/05/grades-and-curves (discussing effects of grade and curve
on productivity of trains).  Heavier trains are most efficient on a flat gradient, as
even a slight rise can add significant resistance to the locomotive. See id.
159. See Tate, supra note 157 (discussing increased dependence on railroads
that line waterways).
160. See id. (suggesting that increased use of oil tankers on trains increases
risk of contaminating waterways with crude oil).
161. Id. (discussing threat of contamination of water used by towns down-
stream from derailment).
162. See Patrick Rucker & David Ljunggren, Exclusive - Canada Insists on Oil
Train Tanker Phase-out Ahead of U.S., REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2015, 4:37 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/14/us-oil-railways-idUSKBN0KN2CB20150114
(discussing Canadian regulator’s insistence of May 2017 phase-out deadline).
163. See id. (criticizing Canada’s failure to address routing issues); see also Eric
de Place & Rich Feldman, Canada vs. the USA on Oil Train Standards, SIGHTLINE
DAILY (Sept. 10, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://daily.sightline.org/2014/09/10/canada-
vs-the-usa-on-oil-train-standards/ [hereinafter de Place & Feldman, Canada vs. the
USA] (criticizing United States’ failure to address issue of gross under insurance).
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terparts.164  In putting forward adequate regulations, both govern-
ments face aggressive opposition from the oil and rail industries.165
A. Canada’s Response to Lac-Megantic
Transport Canada is Canada’s rail safety regulator.166  In April
2014, Transport Canada prohibited the use of DOT-111 units that
had an inherent design flaw in the bottom of the tanker, requiring
the rail companies to immediately remove five thousand of the
most dangerous units from operation.167  The regulator required
the remaining DOT-111s produced prior to 2014 to be retrofitted
or phased out.168  Despite some critics labeling the proposed dead-
line as unrealistic, Transport Canada has, thus far, defended its ag-
gressive May 2017 deadline for phase out compliance.169
Additionally, Transport Canada focused on regulating train op-
eration.170  Investigations into the Lac-Megantic derailment identi-
fied two factors leading to the runaway train: a lone, fatigued
conductor and a failure of the handbrake system.171  As a result,
Transport Canada now requires that each train have two conduc-
tors and that rail companies better monitor fatigue levels of their
conductors.172  Additionally, Transport Canada imposed standard-
ized handbrake requirements for trains.173
164. See  de Place & Feldman, Canada vs. the USA, supra note 163 (determin-
ing that Canadian regulators have addressed numerous aspects of oil by rail better
than American regulators).
165. See Eaton, supra note 8 (analyzing oil and rail industries’ opposition to
regulation).
166. See id. (discussing Canadian regulatory response to Lac-Megantic
catastrophe).
167. See de Place & Feldman, Canada vs. the USA , supra note 163 (praising
immediate removal of certain DOT-111 units resulting in five thousand fewer
DOT-111s available for transporting oil by rail).
168. See Eaton, supra note 8 (detailing Canadian phase-out of pre-2014 DOT-
111s).
169. See Rucker & Ljunggren, supra note 163 (confirming Transport Canada’s
May 2017 deadline).
170. See Proposed Rail Safety Laws to Make Oil Carriers Responsible for Accidents,
CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/proposed-rail-safety-laws-to-make-oil-
carriers-responsible-for-accidents-1.2964879 (last updated Feb. 20, 2015, 8:04 PM)
[hereinafter Proposed Rail Safety Laws] (discussing regulatory changes since Lac-
Megantic).
171. See Monique Muise, Lac-Me´gantic: What Causes a Runaway Train?, MON-
TREAL GAZETTE (July 7, 2013), http://www.montrealgazette.com/M%C3%A9gan
tic+What+causes+runaway+train/8631894/story.html (examining events that
caused train to run away).
172. See Proposed Rail Safety Laws, supra note 170 (discussing regulations re-
lated to train conductors).
173. See id. (discussing standard handbrake requirements for trains).
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On June 24, 2015, Canadian Transport Minister Lisa Raitt an-
nounced the passage of new regulations contained within the Safe
and Accountable Rail Act (SSRA) to address additional concerns
regarding oil-by-rail safety.174  Of these regulations, the most promi-
nent is the new minimum insurance requirements for trains that
transport crude oil.175  Typically, short line railroads carry insur-
ance in the amount of twenty-five million dollars, an amount grossly
insufficient for covering the costs of a significant accident involving
Bakken crude oil.176  The SSRA creates two tiers of liability insur-
ance requirements for short line railroads: the lesser requiring 100
million dollars and the greater requiring 250 million dollars.177
Moreover, railroad companies must now pay a per tonnage fee
when shipping crude oil.178  Fee payments go towards a 250 million
dollar fund to pay for damages in excess of the railroad’s insurance
policy.179
The SSRA also implements further regulations regarding safe
rail practices.180  First, the SSRA expands the Transportation Minis-
ter’s authority to order new safety standards and to expand local
governments’ access to information regarding trains carrying oil.181
Providing local governments with access to information mitigates
the damage a derailment would cause because first responders are
better prepared for such an accident.182  Second, the SSRA makes
revisions to the Safety Management System (SMS) guidelines.183
174. See Canadian Safe And Accountable Rail Act Made Law, UNITED TRANSP.
UNION (June 24, 2015), http://utu.org/2015/06/24/canadian-safe-and-accounta
ble-rail-act-made-law/ (commenting on new rail regulations for 2015).
175. See Proposed Rail Safety Laws, supra note 170 (highlighting new insurance
requirements of SSRA).
176. For a further discussion on the insurance that railroad companies carry,
see supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
177. See Railway Liability Rules, CBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2015, 7:42 PM), http://
www.cbc.ca/news/railway-liability-rules-1.2965782 (discussing how regulation will
establish two tiers of insurance requirements for short line rails).
178. See Proposed Rail Safety Laws, supra note 170 (discussing additional insur-
ance requirements).
179. See id. (identifying purpose of per ton fee).
180. See Mark Winfield, Opinion: Federal Rail-Safety Measures Remain Inadequate,
MONTREAL GAZETTE, http://montrealgazette.com/news/national/opinion-federal-
rail-safety-measures-remain-inadequate (last updated Feb. 25, 2015, 12:53 PM) (dis-
cussing additional regulations proposed SSRA).
181. See id. (discussing expansion of powers).
182. See id. (acknowledging importance of information to first responders).
183. See id. (discussing new suggestions for Safety Management Systems).  A
Safety Management System (SMS) is framework for assessing and managing risk
within a companies transportation practices. See Frequently Asked Questions, TRANS-
PORT CANADA, https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/railsafety/railsafety-faq-969.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2015).  Transport Canada requires railroads to adopt an SMS as part of
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Transport Canada now requires railroad companies to appoint ex-
ecutives responsible for the safety and monitoring of employee fa-
tigue.184  Some critics of oil-by-rail are concerned about the self-
regulation of safety standards, but the SSRA also grants protection
to whistleblowers.185
B. United States’ Regulation of Oil-by-Rail
In May 2015, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Ad-
ministration (PHMSA), in conjunction with the Federal Railroad
Administration, finalized a rule regarding the transportation of
crude oil by rail.186  The regulation pertains to the phase out of the
DOT-111, reduced speed limits, new braking standards, and rail
routing assessment requirements.187
The PHMSA plans to phase out use of the DOT-111 for the
transportation of crude oil by October 2017.188  Unlike Transport
Canada, American regulators have not required the immediate re-
moval of any DOT-111s.189  Moreover, the Final Rule against using
the DOT-111 only applies to trains with at least twenty tankers carry-
ing high-hazard cargo.190  To replace the DOT-111, PHMSA has put
forward two options: (1) the DOT-117, with a thicker shell, a steel
jacket, thermal protection, a head shield, and “electronic-con-
trolled pneumatic brakes”; or (2) the CPC-1232, which addresses
an effort to ingrain safety into the daily culture of the railroad. See Winfield, supra
note 180.
184. See Winfield, supra note 180 (elaborating on SMS requirements).
185. See id. (voicing concerns over railroad companies self-regulating safety).
186. See Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains, 80 Fed. Reg. 26,644 (May 8, 2015)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 171, 172, 173, 174, and 179) [hereinafter “Final
Rule”] (finalizing regulations for transportation of crude oil by rail); see also
Kathryn J. Gainey & Nina S. Thanawala, Recent Regulatory and Legislative Develop-
ments Involving Transportation of Crude Oil and Hazardous Commodities by Rail, FED.
LAW., July 2015, at 58 available at http://www.fedbar.org/Image-Library/Sections-
and-Divisions/TTSL/TFL-July2015.aspx?FT=.pdf)(discussing PHSMA’s new
regulations).
187. See Gainey & Thanawala, supra note 186 (listing proposed regulations).
188. See id. (detailing PHSA’s replacements for DOT-111).  The October 2017
deadline only applies for the transportation of what the Department of Transpor-
tation considers to be the most dangerous of cargo. See Kathryn J. Gainey, Regula-
tory Update on Transportation of Crude Oil by Rail, FED. LAW., Oct./Nov. 2014, at 10
available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/Transportation%20of
%20Crude%20Oil%20By%20Rail.pdf.  The phase-out date of the DOT-111 for
transporting the least dangerous cargo is October 2020. See id.
189. See de Place & Feldman, Canada vs. the USA , supra note 163 (criticizing
United States’ failure to immediately remove dangerous DOT-111s).
190. See id. (identifying loophole allowing continued use of DOT-111 for
transportation of crude oil); see also Gainey & Thanawala, supra note 186 (detailing
discontinuation of DOT-111).
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the issues the DOT-111 had with its bottom release valve.191  Under
the Final Rule, railroads may retrofit their DOT-111s, but retrofit-
ting must bring the DOT-111 up to the standards of the DOT-
117.192
In addition to the phase out of the DOT-111, the Final Rule
reduces speed limits and requires new electronically controlled
pneumatic brakes for “single train[s] transporting seventy or more
loaded tank cars containing Class 3 flammable liquid.”193  The regu-
lation limits the maximum speed limit for trains carrying high-haz-
ard cargo to fifty miles per hour.194  Trains with tank cars that fail to
meet the standard are limited to speeds no faster than forty miles
per hour.195  PHMSA also requires that trains be equipped with an
“enhanced brake signal propagation system . . . involving end-of-
train devices, distributed power systems, or electronic-controlled
pneumatic brakes.”196  The regulation will limit trains that do not
comply with the proposed brake standard to a maximum speed of
thirty miles per hour.197
PHMSA also requires railroads transporting crude oil to “per-
form routing analyses.”198  Railroads already perform routing analy-
ses by assessing twenty-seven different factors to determine the
“safest, most secure route.”199  The Final Rule does not require rail-
roads to provide state first responders with a weekly, reasonable esti-
mate of the number of tanker cars carrying crude oil passing
through each county.200
191. See Gainey & Thanawala, supra note 186 (describing replacements for
DOT-111).
192. See id. (qualifying retrofitting option).
193. See id. (quoting Final Rule in discussion of proposed speed related
regulations).
194. See id. (identifying maximum speed allowed for trains carrying crude
oil).
195. See Gainey & Thanawala, supra note 186 (limiting speed for trains with
tankers that are not up to DOT-117 standard).
196. See id. (discussing PHSA’s new brake system requirements).
197. See id. (assessing consequences of failing to comply with new brake
system).
198. See id. (discussing PHMSA’s plans to address issues regarding trains carry-
ing crude oil through populated areas).
199. See Gainey, supra note 188 (defining routing analyses).  Railroads already
perform routing analyses for other hazardous cargo, such as chlorine. See id.
200. See Gainey & Thanawala, supra note 186 (discussing lack of notification
requirement in Final Rule).
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C. Rail and Oil Industries’ Reaction to Regulation
In opposition, the oil industry and railroads argue that both
Canada and the United States have proposed regulations that
would be an unnecessary and costly burden.201  While there has
been a recent rise in the number of oil spills from derailments, the
oil and rail industries “stress that 99.998 percent of hazardous rail
shipments happen without incident.”202  Although united in their
opposition against new regulations, the oil and rail industries differ
when attributing blame for the recent increase in accidents.203  Oil
companies place blame on their rail industry cohorts, citing human
error and track deficiencies.204  The rail industry, on the other
hand, is split between blaming railroads and railcar producers.205
Railroads counter the oil industry’s claim by blaming the combusti-
bility of crude oil, and turns on the railcar industry by questioning
the “crashworthiness of tank cars.”206
Both the oil and rail industries debate the reasonableness of
the phase out timelines for the DOT-111.207  Industry surveys esti-
mate only fifteen thousand of the fifty thousand DOT-111s in use
can be retrofitted by 2017.208  The estimate appears low because the
DOT-111 requires such extensive retrofitting.209  If the estimate is
accurate, railroads will have to phase out approximately thirty-five
201. See Timothy Cama, Oil Train Fire Rekindles Push for Tanker Rules, THE HILL
(Feb. 18, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/233049-oil-
train-fire-rekindles-push-for-tanker-rules (explaining oil and rail industry’s opposi-
tion to regulation).
202. See id. (discussing overall safety improvements of oil by rail).
203. See Lynn Cook et al., Energy, Rail Firms Fight Some Crude-Train Rules, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2014, 7:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/energy-rail-firms-
unite-against-some-crude-train-rules-1412119895 (breaking down oil and rail indus-
tries’ differing explanations for increase in accidents).
204. See id. (explaining oil industry’s understanding of rail accidents).
205. See id. (discussing differing interests within rail industry between rail-
roads and tanker producers).
206. See id. (detailing stance of railroads against regulation).
207. See id. (questioning whether timeline for phase-out is reasonable).  Rail-
roads do not want to incur the costs that a phase-out of the DOT-111 would re-
quire. See id.  The oil industry does not want the added costs for railroads to raise
shipping rates. See id.  Railcar producers stand to financially gain from the phase-
out, either by selling new tank cars or by providing retrofitting services for old
DOT-111s. See Eaton, supra note 8.  Still, the Railway Supply Institute argues that
the rail industry will not be able to phase-out or retrofit DOT-111s by the end of
2017. See Eaton, supra note 8.  This argument is not shared by the entire railcar
producing industry, as Greenbrier Cos. has labeled the phase-out timetable as
“tight but achievable.” See Cook et al., supra note 203.
208. See Eaton, supra note 8 (detailing Railway Supply Institute’s estimates).
209. See id. (listing retrofitting requirements for DOT-111).
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thousand DOT-111s within the next three years.210  The oil industry
and railroads are concerned that such a dramatic decline in availa-
ble tank cars would also result in a proportionate decline in the
transportation of oil by rail.211
Railroads further object to reducing speed limits.212  They are
concerned that slower travel speeds for trains carrying oil will result
in reduced efficiency throughout the industry’s entire network.213
A significant delay in train traffic could delay delivery of other
goods and result in higher shipping costs.214  Moreover, railroads
question whether reduced speeds are necessary, as derailments
have resulted in oil leaks even when trains were traveling at reduced
speeds.215
V. THE FUTURE OF OIL BY RAIL
The transportation of oil by rail raises two primary future con-
cerns: (1) whether the practice is sufficiently regulated; and (2)
whether the practice will continue to have such a large presence in
the oil industry.216  Concerns regarding regulation have risen as de-
railments in early 2015 have cast doubt as to the adequacy of Trans-
port Canada and PHMSA’s regulations for tank cars.217  These
derailments have reignited the debate over oil by rail, especially in
the context of the Keystone XL Pipeline.218
Although both the United States and Canada are taking steps
towards implementing new regulations, recent evidence suggests
that both nations’ proposals may be insufficient to properly address
210. See id. (discussing phase out of DOT-111).
211. See id. (highlighting concerns of oil industry and railroads).
212. See Cook et al., supra note 203 (discussing railroads’ concerns over reduc-
ing speed of train traffic).
213. See id. (explaining railroads are concerned about efficiency if speeds are
lowered).
214. See Jim Snyder, Railways Enlist Lumberyards in U.S. Oil-Train Speed Fight,
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-15/railways-en
list-lumberyards-in-u-s-oil-train-speed-fight (last updated Oct. 15, 2014, 12:41 PM)
(specifying impact of reducing travel speeds below forty miles per hour for trains).
215. See id. (listing numerous oil spills that resulted from derailments of trains
traveling at slower speeds as part of argument presented by those who do not be-
lieve that reduced speed limits may be ineffective in reducing number of oil spills).
216. For a further discussion of the ongoing issues regarding transporting
crude oil in North America, see infra notes 217-251 and accompanying text.
217. For a further discussion of potential inadequacies of Transport Canada’s
and PHMSA’s regulatory solutions, see infra notes 219-229 and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the recent derailments that reignited debate over the
safety of oil by rail and the Keystone XL Pipeline, see infra notes 223-229 and
accompanying text.
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the issues of transporting oil in North America.219  In February
2015, two derailments, only days apart, resulted in an oil spill, fire,
and explosion.220  On February 14, 2015, a train derailed in Onta-
rio, partially puncturing nineteen of the twenty-five tankers and
spilling an estimated 260,000 gallons of oil.221  On February 17,
2015, just three days later, a train of 109 tanker cars derailed in
West Virginia; nineteen of the twenty-six tankers that derailed
caught fire, forcing nearby residents to evacuate.222
Both trains that derailed were using the CPC-1232 tank car.223
Transport Canada and PHMSA have both proposed replacing the
DOT-111 with the CPC-1232.224  These February spills and resulting
fires are evidence that Transport Canada and PHMSA’s regulatory
measures may be insufficient.225  While the CPC-1232 may address
the bottom pressure release valve issues of the DOT-111, it does not
address the inadequacies of the DOT-111’s thin steel shell, as both
have 7/16-inch shells.226  Further, the leaks and fires in West Vir-
ginia and Ontario are not the first involving the CPC-1232.227  In
April 2014, prior to the PHMSA’s notice of proposed rulemaking, a
219. For a discussion of the recent evidence, see infra notes 220-229 and ac-
companying text.
220. See Edward McAllister, Derailed CSX Train in West Virginia Hauled Newer-
Model Tank Cars, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2015, 5:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/2015/02/17/us-usa-train-derailment-csx-idUSKBN0LK1ST20150217 (detailing
two oil by rail accidents that occurred within three days of each other).
221. See Rob Gillies, Canada Safety Board Says Latest Oil Train Derailment Shows
New Safety Standards Are Inadequate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:44
PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/02/23/canada-oil-train-
accident-shows-new-safety-rules-inadequate (detailing derailment in Ontario,
Canada).
222. See Heyman & Pe´rez-Pen˜a, supra note 132 (detailing derailment in West
Virginia).
223. See McAllister, supra note 220 (identifying tank car in West Virginia de-
railment); see also Gillies, supra note 221 (identifying tank car in Ontario
derailment).
224. See Gillies, supra note 221 (discussing Canada’s regulatory support of
CPC-1232).  For a discussion of PHMSA’s proposed replacement tank cars, see
supra note 191 and accompanying text.
225. See Gillies, supra note 221 (raising questions regarding Canada’s regula-
tion of tank cars carrying crude oil); see also James West, Trains Hauling Crude Oil
Across North America Just Keep Exploding, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 17, 2015, 2:18 PM),
http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2015/02/train-derailment-crude-oil-
explosion-west-virginia (criticizing proposed rules that recommend CPC-1232
models instead of DOT-111 models).
226. See West, supra note 225 (comparing shell thickness of DOT-111 and
CPC-1232 models to proposed shells designed with thicker walls).
227. See id. (describing West Virginia and Lynchburg, Virginia derailments, in
which both trains were pulling CPC-1232 tankers).
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train using CPC-1232 tankers derailed in Lynchburg, Virginia.228
There, the tankers caught fire, leaked oil, and fell into the James
River.229
Debate over the transportation of crude oil escalated in Febru-
ary 2015.230  On February 24, 2015, one week after the derailment
in West Virginia, President Obama vetoed the construction of the
Keystone XL pipeline.231  For Americans, then, there is a battle over
determining how oil, particularly Bakken crude, should be
transported.232
Both transportation of oil via rail and pipelines have risks that
can result in oil spills.233  Rail is far more likely to have an accident
resulting in an oil leak.234  In 2013, transport by rail resulted in over
four hundred accidents per billion barrels of oil, while pipelines
annually average twenty-two accidents per billion barrels of oil
transported.235  While four hundred accidents may seem high, in
2011, rail resulted in over seven hundred accidents.236
228. See Christina Nunez, Oil Train Derails in Lynchburg, Virginia, NAT’L GEO-
GRAPHIC (May 2, 2014, 2:07 PM), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/ener
gy/2014/04/140430-oil-train-derails-in-lynchburg-virginia/ [hereinafter Nunez,
Oil Train Derails] (recounting train derailment in Lynchburg, Virginia that caused
significant damage); see also West, supra note 225 (identifying tankers used in
Lynchburg derailment as CPC-1232 models).
229. See Nunez, Oil Train Derails, supra note 228 (detailing damage of Lynch-
burg derailment).  One CPC-1232 tank car also fell into Kanawha River during the
West Virginia derailment, similar to the derailment in Lynchburg. See McAllister,
supra note 220.
230. See Ken Silverstein, Interest in Keystone Pipeline Mushrooms After Rail Cars
Carrying Oil Explode, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kensilverstein/2015/02/19/interest-in-keystone-pipeline-mushrooms-after-
rail-cars-carrying-oil-explode/ (commenting on growing debate over safety and ef-
ficiency of oil by rail and Keystone XL).
231. See Elana Schor, President Obama Vetoes Keystone Bill; GOP Plans Override
Vote, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/obama-vetoes-keystone-
bill-115462.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2015, 6:43 PM) (discussing reasons why
President Obama vetoed Keystone XL).
232. See Silverstein, supra note 230 (discussing debate over best way to trans-
port crude oil in United States).
233. See Christopher Ingraham, It’s a Lot Riskier to Move Oil by Train Instead of
Pipeline, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2015/02/20/its-a-lot-riskier-to-move-oil-by-train-instead-of-pipe
line/ (comparing dangers of transporting oil via rail versus via pipeline).
234. See id. (noting rail poses higher risk for accident than does pipeline, and
pipeline accidents occur at more stable rate).
235. See id. (comparing number of accidents per billion barrels of oil trans-
ported via rail versus via pipeline).
236. See id. (noting decline in frequency of rail accidents).
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The unpredicted and sudden demand for oil by rail can ex-
plain this high accident rate.237  The decline in accidents from 2001
to 2013, however, could be representative of the rail industry gain-
ing more experience in transporting such high volumes of crude
oil.238  Transportation by rail may be more prone to accidents gen-
erally, but pipeline accidents typically leak more oil.239  Although
pipeline accidents may be “bigger” in the sense that they leak more
oil, they lack the explosive capacity that accompanies
derailments.240
When assessing what mode of transportation of crude oil is
most appropriate, economic factors must be considered in addition
to weighing the risks of rail versus pipeline distribution.241  Even if
transportation by way of rail was the more dangerous option, it
would still be the more immediately accessible option.242  The rea-
son why rail has been used to transport Bakken crude oil is because
the pipeline infrastructure in North Dakota, and in other parts of
the nation, is insufficient to meet the demand for refined oil.243
Building a pipeline infrastructure is costly and requires regulatory
oversight.244  The ongoing debate over the Keystone XL Pipeline
establishes political uncertainty.245  In comparison, North
America’s railroad infrastructure is already expansive enough to
transport oil from wells to refineries.246  North American pipelines
cover only fifty-seven thousand miles, while railroads cover 140
237. See id. (hypothesizing rail industry’s lack of preparation for demand from
oil industry could correlate to high accident rate in recent years).
238. See Ingraham, supra note 233 (analyzing reasons for increases and de-
creases in trends in rail accidents).
239. See id. (comparing rail and pipeline by gallons of oil spilled).  In 2013,
rail spilled far more oil per billion barrels of oil transported than pipeline, but the
amount of oil spilled by rail was uncharacteristically high due to major spills in
Aliceville, Alabama and Casselton, North Dakota. See id.
240. See id. (concluding oil transportation via rail is more dangerous than oil
transportation via pipeline).
241. For a discussion of the economic differences between transporting oil by
rail or pipeline, see infra notes 242-248 and accompanying text.
242. See Silverstein, supra note 230 (discussing rail’s advantage over pipeline
in regions that are experiencing North American oil boom).
243. See id. (explaining that pipelines are not used to transport Bakken Crude
because producers are unable to build pipelines to meet high demand).
244. See id. (detailing barriers to pipeline expansion).
245. See Loren Steffy, Keystone Rhetoric Roils as Oil Trains Roll, FORBES (Feb. 24,
2015, 10:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorensteffy/2015/02/24/keystone-
rhetoric-roils-as-oil-trains-roll/ (commenting on political entrenchment surround-
ing Keystone XL, including Republicans’ stance, President Obama’s stance, and
Keystone XL’s future).
246. See Silverstein, supra note 230 (noting expansive nature of ground rail-
roads as compared to limited coverage of pipelines).
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thousand miles.247  Rail has the advantage of being immediately ac-
cessible to the oil industry, making it a cheaper and more certain
option.248
With the future of the Keystone XL pipeline becoming more
uncertain, the increased use of rail to transport oil becomes more
likely.249  Although concerns and resulting regulations regarding
the transportation of oil by rail have risen since the 2015 derail-
ments, much more needs to be accomplished.250  The oil and rail
industries will continue to use the DOT-111 tanker into 2017, and
there are significant concerns that the replacement tankers will
continue to pose the same risks, allowing for continued dangers.251
Evan W. Busteed*
247. See Conca, supra note 78 (explaining that railroad track is currently more
expansive than crude oil pipeline coverage in United States).
248. See id. (noting that adapting railroads to oil industry’s needs by building
new terminals and constructing new railroads is less expensive than expanding
pipeline coverage).
249. See Eaton, supra note 8 (discussing American Petroleum Institute’s argu-
ment that failure to approve Keystone XL pipeline requires further investment in
rail).
250. See Silverstein, supra note 230 (discussing growing interest in oil by rail).
For a further discussion of the growing interest in oil by rail, see supra notes 230-
232 and accompanying text.
251. See de Place & Feldman, Canada vs. the USA, supra note 163 (criticizing
both United States and Canada for not immediately banning all DOT-111s from
transporting Bakken crude oil).  For a discussion of why the replacement tankers
will continue to pose concerns, see supra notes 219-229 and accompanying text.
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